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-whether this was an attorney's work product or material prepared
for litigation.
CPLR 3101(d): Protection accorded to statements nude to a
municipality by its employees.
In Donnelly v. County of Nassau,143 plaintiff and a Nassau
County police officer were involved in an automobile accident.
Plaintiff sought discovery of: (1) a memorandum made by the
police officer; and (2) a memorandum and report of investigation
of a police sergeant, which had been forwarded to the county
attorney. The court held that these items were analogous to the
reports made in Finegold v. Lewis'" and Kandel v. Tocher,"4 and
that they were, therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to
CPLR 3101(d).'"
In analogizing a municipality to an insurance carrier, the court
classified the former as a self-insurer.147 In Kandel, "insured to
insurer" reports were distinguished from those "resulting from the
regular internal operations of an enterprise," the latter being held
not to fall within the purview of CPLR 3101(d).
The underlying consideration in Kandel, in exempting these
reports from disclosure, was that liability insurance is essentially
litigation insurance. The court evidently was concerned with preventing the problem of information being withheld by the insured
from his liability insurer.
Certainly, in the instant case, it appears that the reports were
made in the regular course of defendant's business-by police
officers to their superiors--despite the fact that defendant was also
a self-insurer. Furthermore, the result which the court in Kandel
was most interested in effectuating, i.e., the disclosure of all relevant
and pertinent information to the liability insurer, would, in all
likelihood, occur without the aid of 3101(d)'s protection. The
withholding of information by the employee is not likely to occur
when weighed against the possibility of consequent termination of
employment.
However, it should be noted that a report made in the regular
course of business might, under certain instances, also be material
prepared for litigation. This dual classification of a report, as
illustrated in Donnelly, with its consequent legal effects in the area
'4346 Misc. 2d 895, 261 N.Y.S2d 192 (App. Term 7d Dep't 1965).
'L422 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965).
14522 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965).
146 These two cases are analyzed in The Biannual Survey of New York

JOHN'S L. REV. 122, 154 (1965).
A self-insurer is exactly what the name imports, i.e., it bears the
risk of its own possible liability, rather than contracting therefor with an
insurance carrier.
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of disclosure, has not been discussed by the courts. Under Kandel's
rationale, reports prepared solely "for litigation purposes" are
exempt. This interpretation appears to be unjustified due to the
absence of any exclusive or singular purpose in CPLR 3101(d).
Finally, there is the argument that if the county is acting in
the capacity of an insurer, albeit a self-insurer, it seems only just
that it receive all the privileges which are accorded to any other
insurer.'" 8
The foregoing demonstrates the difficulties which the courts
may be faced with in applying Finegold and Kandel---difficulties
which, it seems, the court in the instant case did not treat. And
from an examination of both arguments, it is submitted that the
case was incorrectly decided, for the considerations which led to the
holdings in Finegold and Kandel were not present in the instant
case.
CJPLR 3122: Affidavits necessary in opposition to a notice to
produce to negate any presumption of possession, custody or control.
In Fugazy v. Time, Inc.,'49 a libel action, defendant moved
for disclosure of various items under CPLR 3120. In opposition
thereto, the sole objection of plaintiff, a corporate officer, was that
he did not have possession of the items in question (corporate and
personal records). However, no affidavit was submitted by plaintiff
in support thereof, and no objection was made with respect to the
relevancy or materiality of the materials sought. The court deemed
the objection invalid and allowed disclosure.
It would appear, therefore, that it is incumbent upon a party
who is served with a notice to produce to negate and support by
affidavit any presumption of possession, custody or control. It
seems only logical to presume that a corporate officer would have
one of the three, i.e., possession, custody, or control (of the corporate records), and, if he is seeking to avoid the provisions of
CPLR 3120, he should negate any such presumption. The burden
should be upon such a party, not upon his adversary who in all
likelihood has less knowledge concerning the whereabouts of the
corporate records.
14s This position finds support in the treatise of Professor Weinstein wherein,
commenting on Donnelly, he states: "Certainly, a self-insurer should be given
no advantage over an entity that buys insurance. If the court believes
that substantially the same kind of report would have been made for internal
purposes of the municipality, whether or not it was self-insured, the document
should be treated as an accident report and disclosure should be required."
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(1965). Ironically, he was the very person who, as county attorney, successfully argued for exactly the opposite result.
14924 App. Div. 2d 443, 260 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1st Dep't 1965).

